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Firewalls are a effective means of protecting a local system or network of systems from network-based
security threats. In this paper, we propose a policy algebra framework for security policy enforcement in
hybrid firewalls, ones that exist both in the network and on end systems. To preserve the security semantics,
the policy algebras provide a formalism to compute addition, conjunction, subtraction, and summation on
rule sets; it also defines the cost and risk functions associated with policy enforcement. Policy outsourcing
triggers global cost minimization. We show that our framework can easily be extended to support packet
filter firewall policies. Finally, we discuss special challenges and requirements for applying the policy
algebra framework to MANETs.
1 Introduction
Firewalls are a effective means of protecting a local system or network of systems from network-based se-
curity threats. Conventional firewalls rely on the notion of restricted topology and control entry points to
to the network. All traffic from the inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the firewall. Only
authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be allowed to pass. Since the traditional ap-
proach made assumptions on restricted network topology and trust on every single host in the intranet, the
concept of distributed firewalls [Bel99] was proposed to address the shortcomings. In the distributed fire-
wall scheme, security policy is still centrally defined, but enforcement is pushed to the individual end hosts.
These two approaches can be combined together to achieve desired functionality with lower cost. In a hy-
brid implementation, some hosts are behind the traditional firewalls, while others live on the outside and can
be protected using distributed firewall approach; alternatively, IPSEC may be ignored entirely and instead
address-dependent rules are distributed and enforced by individual end hosts.
There are many possible arrangement for security policies. For a given initial policy, we wish to find one
that has the following properties:
1. It verifiably has the same security semantics as the original;
2. It minimizes total system cost;
3. It keeps the risk within acceptable bounds.
In this paper, we propose a policy algebra framework for security policy enforcement in hybrid firewalls.
The advantages of having such a framework to compose security polices are many. First of all, the policy
algebras provide a formalism to compute the addition, conjunction, subtraction, summation on rule sets.
Secondly, a policy algebra frame facilitates the decentralization of security rule enforcement. By applying
the algebra, different rule arrangements can be proposed. The compositional framework allows specifiers of
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policies to determine if the policy in fact result in the same accesses as the old, thus ensuring that property 1
holds.
Thirdly, firewall configuration still remains a crucial task. A quantitative study of firewall configuration
[Woo04], shows that corporate firewalls are often enforcing poorly written rule sets. For well-configured
firewalls, a small rule set or configuration file is highly recommended. By integrating rules or subtracting the
rules that have already been enforced in the local environment, the size of individual rule sets is reduced.
Finally, a policy algebra enables rule outsourcing for hybrid firewalls. Modern heterogeneous networks
consist of nodes with diversified energy storage and computation capacity. A host with low computational
power can outsource part of its rule set to a security policy delegate that it trusts, thus lowering costs (prop-
erty 2. In addition, the cost constraints can be made subject to the acceptable risk level (property 3. For
instance, the policy algebra helps the specifier to answer the following questions: What is the effective filter-
ing that reaches host A given the fact the A’s upstream neighbors have already enforced their rule sets? What
is the minimal set of rules A could push to its neighbors in order to achieve the same result without local
filtering?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduce the policy algebra framework in detail.
Section 3 elaborates how the framework can be further extended to support packet filter firewall policies.
Section 4 discusses the specific challenges faced when importing the policy algebra framework in mobile ad
hoc networks (MANET). Related works are described in section 5 and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Policy Algebra Framework
In this section, we present the policy algebra framework in detail. To make our approach applicable for
general security policies in hybrid firewalls, we do not make any assumption on the policy language which
states what sort of connections are permitted or prohibited.
2.1 Policies and Rules
To resolve the ambiguity in our discussion, we formally define a policy P as an unordered set of rules,
denoted as P = {r1, r2, ..., rk} and |P| = k. How to construct the rule set for a given policy is determined
by the specific policy language; the details are irrelevant for our discussion. Without loss of generality, one
can view the rule set {r1, r2, ..., rk} as a detailed interpretation of a security policy P to be enforced in the
network. An action A is said to be accepted by the policy if it matches any rule in the rule set. To facilitate
our discussion, we define a universal policy U that accepts any kind of actions and also an empty policy φ
that accepts nothing.
2.2 The Policy Algebra
Intuitively, a policy algebra could be represented as rule set operations. Compound policies can be obtained by
combining policy rule sets through the algebra operators. We formally define the following algebra operators
over rule sets:
• Addition (+) merges two policy rule sets by returning their set unions provided that there is no conflict
among the rules involved, denoted as P1 + P2 = P3, where |P3| ≤ |P1| + |P2|. If the combination
of two rule sets arises conflict, it must be resolved using a decorrelation algorithm; we discuss that
further in the following section. The property of the Addition (+) operation ensures that any action A
accepted by P1 or P2 will be accepted by P3 as well.
• Conjunction (∩) merges two policy rule sets by returning their intersection, denoted as P1 ∩P2 = P3,
where |P3| ≤ |P1| and |P3| ≤ |P2|. Any action A accepted by P3 should be accepted by P1 and P2
as well.
• Subtraction (−) reduces a policy rule set by eliminating all the rules in the second policy, denoted as





) is defined as a list of Addition (+) operations, where ∑ni=1 Pi = P1+P2+...+Pn = P
and |P| ≤ |P1|+ |P2|+ ...+ |Pn|. Conflict resolution is necessary if conflicts arise during summation.
Intuitively, an action A accepted by any policy rule set Pi will be accepted by P .
The above policy algebra operations are interpreted as set operations. For instance, Addition(+) operation
keeps only distinct rules appearing in eitherP1 orP2. Conjunction (∩) returns the common rules appearing in
both P1 and P2. Subtraction (−) eliminates the rules existing in P2 from P1. Intuitively, one can view them
as external operations since they do not modify any single policy rule; only the set operations are applied
over the policy rule set. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that the composition of individual rules
may result in fewer rules to be enforced in the network. For instance, the composition of rule r1 and rule
r2 produces a single rule r3 that maintains the same access control effect that r1 and r2 together provide.
This observation inspires us to define another set of algebra operators over individual rules. We refer them
as internal operations since individual policy rules are modified during the operation. The most significant
benefit of the internal operations is to reduce the size of rule set. As we discussed in the previous section,
reduced rule set can improve the network traffic throughput. Thus we define the following algebra operators
over individual rules:
• Addition (+r) merges two security policy rules by returning the set union of them, denoted as r1 +r
r2 = r, where r represents a single policy rule if r1 and r2 can be composed into one rule, otherwise
r = {r1, r2}. Note that Addition (+r) is non-commutative if the two rules are correlated. That is, the
policy effect of applying r1 followed by r2 is not necessarily the same as applying r2 first.
• Conjunction (∩r) merges two security policy rules by returning their intersection, denoted as r1∩rr2 =
r, where r = φ if the two policy rules share no security effect in common. Any action A matches r
should also match r1 and r2 as well.
• Subtraction (−r) reduces a policy rule set by eliminating the secure effect in the second policy rule,
denoted as r1 − r2 = r. If a given action A matches r1 but not r3, then it must match rule r2.
• Summation (
∑
r) is defined as a list of Addition (+r) operations, where
∑n
r i=1 ri = r1 +r r2 +r ...+r
rn = r. Intuitively, an action A matches any of the policy rule ri will also match rule r. In the worst
case, none pair of rules can be composed using Addition (+r) operation, then Summation (
∑
r) simply
returns the set union of the rules and we have r = {r1, r2, ..., rn}.
Note that not any two rules can be composed using the above internal algebra operations. For example,
a policy rule on secure authentication obviously cannot be composed with another policy rule on file access
control. Furthermore, the operands of the internal algebra operators must share the same syntax and semantics
defined by the specific policy language.
2.3 The Network Model
We consider a heterogeneous network consisting of N nodes. Each host has its own characteristics, such as
computational power. In a hybrid firewall implementation, whether a host is inside the traditional boundary,
outside it, in parallel with it, or even integrated with it is irrelevant to our discussion on policy algebras.
Depending on the security goals to be achieved, each host u has its own set of policies to be enforced
denoted as Su; |Su| represents the number of distinct policies required by host u. Since the security policies
are computed in a central unit before shipping out to destination hosts, we adopt the notationP(i,j) to describe
the jth policy for node ni and use rule set P∗i to denote the filtering effect host ni has already observed in the
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P ′(i,j) describes the policy rule sets to be enforced for all the hosts in the
entire network.
2.4 Cost and Risk Functions
Policy enforcement in firewalls is costly. It requires additional CPU cycles to perform rule checking; these
tasks thus consume the host’s computational energy and perhaps battery power. One of the goals for firewall
configuration is to minimize the cost for rule enforcement while achieving the desired access control. Thus,
we define a cost function associated with each policy enforcement denoted as C(P(i,j)). Policy outsourcing
enables a single policy P(i,j) to be enforced at different locations in the network with, consequently, different
costs. Intuitively, local host ni does not experience C(P(i,j)) if it decides to outsource this policy to some
delegate in the network without any local enforcement. However the term C(P(i,j)) is still included in the
global cost computation.
Policy outsourcing in firewalls is risky. A host becomes vulnerable if its security policy delegates have
been compromised by attackers. Different risk levels can be experienced if the host chooses to outsource its
security policies to varying locations in the network. Consider a concrete example: if host A chooses to out-
source rules to one of its direct neighbors, then host A is vulnerable if this neighbor node gets compromised.
If, however, host A decides to ship out its rules to a upstream node that is a few hops away, then host A
becomes vulnerable if any node along the path from A to its delegate is compromised. In another example, a
host might be willing to split the risk by choosing a few rule delegates to avoid single point failure. Besides
compromised hosts, compromised links also introduce risks in policy enforcement and delegation. Hence we
use R(P(i,j)) to represent the risk associated with this particular enforcement for the jth policy for node ni.
Intuitively, R(P(i,j)) experiences the lowest risk level if host ni chooses the implement P(i,j) by itself.
We need to consider both the cost and the risk for policy enforcement in hybrid firewall configurations.
Thus we compute the tuple < cost, risk > = < C(P(i,j)),R(P(i,j)) > associated with the enforcement of
policy P(i,j).
2.5 Global Minimization
Policy outsourcing, as described in the previous section, determines that a single policyP(i,j) can be enforced
at different locations in the network with varying < C(P(i,j)),R(P(i,j)) > to achieve the same access control
effects. The advantages of security policy outsourcing are many.
• It is an effective way to reduce the size of rule sets; it thus improves the network throughput by per-
forming less rule checking.
• It balances the utilization of computational power in the whole network. Hosts with low energy can
push part or all of their security polices to their upstream neighbors, which are more capable of expen-
sive computations.
• It can also conserve energy for packet transmission by reducing the traffic in the network. Packets
blocked by security policies in upstream nodes will never appear in the downstream path.
• Finally and most importantly, policy outsourcing enables global minimization of the costs and risks
associated with rule enforcement in firewall configurations.
Given the formalism of policy algebras and cost/risk functions, we define the cost of policy enforcement



















Thus, global minimization on cost is achieved by looking for an optimal firewall configuration with policy
outsourcing to result in the minimal value of CG. A similar global minimization can be performed on RG as
well.
Normally, one firewall configuration can help us to achieve either the minimal value of CG or RG but not
both. Rule enforcement with lower cost may result in a higher risk level. As a concrete example, suppose
host A decides to outsource policy P to its upstream neighbor B, which has more computational power.
In this case, lower C(P) is incurred but with higher R(P) since A becomes vulnerable if any host along
the path from A to B gets comprised by the attacker. Under most circumstances, we are more interested
in minimizing the cost function CG. When such a trade off occurs during firewall configuration, it is the
specifier’s choice to make decisions on global cost minimization. One possible decision is to consider only
the rules with risk lower than a threshold value λr . Thus the global cost minimization will compute CG,
where every enforcement of P ′(i,j) satisfies the condition that R(P ′(i,j)) ≤ λr.
3 Policy Algebra Instantiation
As discussed in the previous section, our policy algebra framework is applicable for general security policies.
In this section, we elaborate how the policy algebra framework can be applied to packet filter firewalls as a
concrete example. We choose packet filtering for illustration primarily because it is the original and most
basic type of firewall. Packet filters are installed in many gateway routers, due to their relative simplicity and
ease of implementation. They allows users to create a set of rules that either discard or accept traffic over
a network connection. However, with the increasing complexity of network topology and security policy
requirement, the rule set of packet filters can become extremely large and thus is hard to configure and
maintain. Moreover, packet filters become the bottleneck of the network when the increased latency caused
by filtering forces the interface buffer queue to drop further packets. Fortunately, with the policy algebra
framework, one can perform optimization on packet filter rule sets and thus improve the throughput of the
network.
3.1 Packet Filter Rules
A packet filter has a set of rules with accept or deny actions. When the packet filter receives a data packet, the
filter compares the packet against a pre-configured rule set. At the first match, the packet filter either accepts
or denies the packet. Filtering rules are based on information contained in a network packet: source and/or
destination IP addresses, source and/or destination port numbers, IP protocol field, flags in TCP header if set,
direction of inbound or outbound traffic, and which interface the packet is traversing. For the simplicity of
our discussion, we consider very basic packet filer rules consisting of the most critical information: action,
source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port number. Simple packet filter
rules look like the following:1
action src port dest port comment
block SPIGOT * * * we don’t trust these people
allow * * OUR-GW 25 connection to our SMTP port
These two rules specify a secure policy on our SMTP mail service. The first rule blocks any inbound
traffic from SPIGOT to our internal network since we don’t trust them. The second rule allows outside hosts
other than SPIGOT to connect to our SMTP mail server on host OUR-GW at port 25. The rules are applied
in order from top to bottom. Any packets that are not explicitly allowed by a filter rule are rejected. That is,
1Example taken from [CBR03].
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any rule set is followed by an implicit rule saying:
action src port dest port comment
block * * * * default
3.2 Policy Algebra Refinement
To follow the previous notation, we describe a security policy as a set of packet filter rules, i.e, P =
{r1, r2, ..., rk}. P could represent a security policy on accessing the internal SMTP mail server, handling
DNS queries, or even the entire the packet filter rule set for a network host. Our previous definition on rule
set representsP as an unordered set of rules. However, rule sets for packet filter firewall maintains strict order
when rules are checked from top to bottom. Rules can be correlated to each other in the way that reversed
order of rules or any subset of rules will have different filtering effect. Consider the following two rules:
action src port dest port comment
allow * * host-A 80 allows outsiders connect to host-A for web service
block * * host-A * default
The filtering effect of the two rules indicate that only web traffic connected to port 80 on host-A is allowed
whereas any other connection to host-A will be blocked. If we reverse the order of the two rules, no web
traffic can reach host-A. On the other hand, if we enforce the second rule (a subset of rules) at a upstream
neighbor of host-A, host-A will not receive any web traffic either. This ordering property introduce extra diffi-
culty for external algebra operations since the order of packet filter rules may alter the semantics; even worse,
the filtering effect cannot be maintained. The solution is to perform decorrelation on packet filter rules to re-
move any ambiguity. We describe each packet filter rule as r = [action, IPsrc, Portsrc, IPdest, Portdest],
where the action is either allow or block in packet filter firewall rules. IPsrc and IPdest may represent one
single IP address or a particular subnet of interest. Similarly, Portsrc and Portdest can also refer to a specific
port number or a set of port numbers. We also have the default rule represented as r∗ = [block, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗],
which simply blocks any incoming or outgoing traffic. Given the detailed syntax and semantics of packet
filter rules, two rules are considered to be correlated if there is a non-nil intersection between the values of
each of their attributes (except for the Action field). The goal of a decorrelation algorithm is to remove any
existing correlations in the rule set. Once the rules are decorrelated, there is no longer any ordering require-
ment on the filtering rules, since only one rule will match any requested communication. [SC00] describes a
decorrelation algorithm in detail. The previous example after decorrelation looks like this:
action src port dest port comment
allow * * host-A 80 allows outsiders connect to host-A for web service
block * * not host-A * default
External operations like Addition (+), Conjunction (∩), Subtraction (−) and Summation (∑) for pol-
icy algebra are similar for most policy languages since they are interpreted as basic set operations. Here
we want to focus our discussion on internal operations over individual packet filter rules since this part of
the policy algebra framework is determined by the specific semantics of a policy language. Given r1 =
[action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ] and r2 = [action2, IPsrc2 , Portsrc2 ,
IPdest2 , Portdest2 ], we then refine the internal algebra operators as following:
• Addition (+r) We have the following five cases:
1. If action1 = action2, Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 , IPdest1 = IPdest2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 ,
then r1 +r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 ∪ IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ];
2. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , IPdest1 = IPdest2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 , then
r1 +r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 ∪ Portsrc2 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ];
3. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 , then
r1 +r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 ∪ IPdest2 , Portdest1 ];
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4. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 and IPdest1 = IPdest2 , then
r1 +r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ∪ Portdest2 ];
5. Otherwise, r1 +r r2 = {r1, r2}.
• Conjunction (∩r) if action1 = action2, then we have r1∩rr2 = [action1, IPsrc1∩IPsrc2 , Portsrc1∩
Portsrc2 , IPdest1 ∩ IPdest2 , Portdest1 ∩ Portdest2 ].
• Subtraction (−r) similar to the Addition (+r) operation, we also have the following five cases:
1. If action1 = action2, Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 , IPdest1 = IPdest2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 ,
then r1 −r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1\IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ];
2. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , IPdest1 = IPdest2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 , then
r1 −r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1\Portsrc2 , IPdest1 , Portdest1 ];
3. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 and Portdest1 = Portdest2 , then
r1 −r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1\IPdest2 , Portdest1 ];
4. If action1 = action2, IPsrc1 = IPsrc2 , Portsrc1 = Portsrc2 and IPdest1 = IPdest2 , then
r1 −r r2 = [action1, IPsrc1 , Portsrc1 , IPdest1 , Portdest1\Portdest2 ];
5. Otherwise, r1 −r r2 = r1.
• Summation (
∑
r) is defined as a list of Addition (+r) operations, where
∑n
r i=1 ri = r1 +r r2 +r ...+r
rn = r.
As a concrete example, consider the following set of packet filter rules:
rule action src port dest port
r1 allow 10.0.0.0/16 * Mail-server 25
r2 allow 10.0.0.0/8 * Mail-server 25
r3 block SPIGOT * DMZ, Mail-server 25
r4 block SPIGOT * DMZ 25
Now we show how the internal algebra operators can be applied:
rule action src port dest port
r1 +r r2 allow 10.0.0.0/8 * Mail-server 25
r3 ∩r r4 block SPIGOT * DMZ 25
r3 −r r4 block SPIGOT * Mail-server 25
3.3 Cost and Risk Functions
In reality, the size of rule set limits how well a packet filter can achieve its goal. A rule set is a linear list
of individual rules, which are evaluated from top to bottom for a given packet. Packets have to pass through
the filtering device, adding some amount of latency between the time a packet is received and the time it is
forwarded. Any device can only process a finite amount of packets per second. When packets arrive at a
higher rate than the device can forward them, packets are lost. The input processor passes packets to packet
filter in a sequential manner. An obvious choice for the cost function associated with each packet filter firewall
policy P is the number of rules in the rule set. As the packet filter rule set gets larger, it takes more time and
computing resources to perform the filtering task. Although several rule set optimization mechanisms have
been proposed, it remains the bottleneck for packet filter performance.
As discussed in the policy algebra framework, outsourcing packet filter rules to upstream neighbors can be
risky. A benefit from rule outsourcing is that it conserves communication channel bandwidth by eliminating
blocked traffic at upstream nodes. Thus, unauthorized packets will not even reach the target host. This also
saves battery power on the transmitting node. Similarly, if the same packet filter rule is required by several
downstream hosts, a composed rule can be enforced at the upstream node to maintain the same filtering effect.
However, once this upstream node 9s compromised, the protected downstream hosts become vulnerable.
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Intuitively, the number of hops from the enforcement delegate to the protected host can be used as the risk
function.
3.4 Conflict Resolution
Multiple, correlated packet filter rules can cause conflicts when mapping packets to filters, as discussed in
[HSP00]. In reality, we assume that with careful configuration by network administrator, such conflict will
not occur within the local rule set of a network host. Unfortunately, security policy outsourcing may bring
this problem back. Consider the following two rules:
rule action src port dest port
ra block 10.0.0.0/8 * * 25
rb allow 10.0.0.0/8 * host-B 25
Rule ra is required by upstream host-A such that any traffic connecting on port 25 from 10.0.0.0/8 is
blocked. However, rule rb enforced at downstream host-B allows 10.0.0.0/8 to connect to its mail service.
If host-B wishes to outsource rb to its upstream neighbor host-A, a conflict arises. Moreover, depending on
the order of rules to be checked, the union of these two rules produces different filtering effects. If rule ra
is placed in front of rule rb, then legitimate web traffic from 10.0.0.0/8 can never reach host-B; if rule rb
is checked first, then only web traffic from 10.0.0.0/8 destined for host-B is allowed. Obviously, the first
approach marks the more restrictive rule with higher precedence, while the second approach may be desired
if host-B is configured to handle web traffic from 10.0.0.0/8. One feasible solution is to apply decorrelation
algorithms to the set of correlated rules. Thus the two rules become:
rule action src port dest port
ra block 10.0.0.0/8 * not host-B 25
rb allow 10.0.0.0/8 * host-B 25
No matter what order these two rules are placed at host-A, it results in the same filtering effect as the
second approach described above. Another possible solution is to simply disallow rule outsourcing if conflict
can be detected. It is the network administrator’s decision to resolve conflicts when applying the policy
algebra framework. Our algebra cannot prevent conflicts; it can, however, reveal their existence.
3.5 Efficiency of Decorrelation Algorithm
As we discussed previously, the decorrelation algorithm is required to solve the ordering problem for packet
filter rule sets and to resolve conflicts if possible. On the other hand, one of the objectives for policy out-
sourcing is to minimize the size of rule sets and to improve the filtering performance. Hence the efficiency of
decorrelation algorithm becomes an interesting problem. Let us consider the following example:
rule action src port dest port
r1 allow 1.2.3.4 * web-server 80
r2 block * * web-server 80
The filtering effect of applying rule r1 and r2 will block all http traffic and only allow source 1.2.3.4 to com-
municate with the web-server on port 80. To decorrelate this rule set, we have two options:
rule action src port dest port
r1 allow 1.2.3.4 * web-server 80
r2 block 0.0.0.0-1.2.3.3 * web-server 80
r3 block 1.2.3.5-255.255.255.255 * web-server 80
or,
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rule action src port dest port
r′1 allow 1.2.3.4 * web-server 80
r′2 block not 1.2.3.4 * web-server 80
The first approach results in more rules in the decorrelated rule set. If more check points like host 1.2.3.4 or
more subnets are involved, as in many firewalls or routers, we may end up with a combinational explosion,
resulting in a very inefficient system. Fortunately, the second approach, which uses negative rules, does not
increase the size of rule set by as much. The decorrelation algorithm introduced in [SC00] takes this approach.
Moreover, negative statements are often more natural to users, and sometimes allow a more efficient statement
of the security policy. For instance, an administrator often needs to exclude a small set of machines from the
normal host set for security purposes.
We claim that introducing negative expressions in the rule attributes improves the efficiency of decorrela-
tion algorithm by generating a relatively small set of rules. However, the design issue becomes how to define
and allow a simple, yet adequate, form of negative expressions in security policies [BMNW04].
4 Policy Algebra in MANET
Previous discussion on the policy algebra framework makes the general assumption of a heterogeneous net-
work. In this section, we will describe the challenges and special requirements for applying the policy algebra
framework in mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). Furthermore, we state several requirements such that the
framework can be extended to become effective in a coalition MANET environment.
4.1 Challenges in MANET
A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a self-configuring network of mobile routers and associated hosts
connected by wireless links. The union of these mobile nodes forms an arbitrary network topology, changing
rapidly and unpredictably with time. Such a network may operate on its own or be connected to the outside
Internet. Firewall configuration in MANET faces many challenges.
• Mobile nodes join or leave the network unpredictably. Hybrid firewall implementation is a good choice
for MANETs, since conventional firewalls strongly rely on a static topology with the concept of “in-
side” and “outside”. The policy algebra framework facilitates policy enforcement at each end host, and
hence is unaffected by topology changes.
• While full-fledged desktop PCs could manage security mechanisms such as cryptography without much
trouble, the same cannot be said for small, energy-limited mobile nodes. The heterogeneity property
of MANETs dictates that computationally intensive tasks may not be acceptable for hosts with lower
computational power. Policy outsourcing introduced in our algebra framework balances the utilization
of power across the whole network, by outsourcing security policy to hosts with more capability.
• As individual nodes move around, they need to assess the authority of other nodes to act as firewalls for
them. Thus, the framework plays a crucial role in security policy delegation. Intuitively, a node that is
at risk of capture should not be considered as a good candidate for policy outsourcing. Less obviously,
a rapidly moving nodes may be a poor choice as well, because it may drop out of the communication
graph too soon.
4.2 Requirements of Policy Algebra Framework for MANET
Since the firewall configuration in a MANET faces special challenges, we discuss several requirements as an
extension for our policy algebra framework to facilitate the coalition MANET environment.
Firstly, optimizing firewall policy to a changing topology requires secure knowledge of the topology, as
well as communication and negotiation of security policy. Particularly, policy outsourcing in our framework
requires that hosts be able to exchange security policies with neighboring nodes. Delegate selection for policy
outsourcing also requires that the local host securely assess the authorization of its neighbors.
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Secondly, light-weight algorithms for computing the cost and risk are strongly desired in policy algebra
framework for MANETs. Small and energy-limited mobile nodes cannot afford computationally intensive
operations, since the network lifetime is also a crucial metric for measuring MANET overall performance.
Finally, policy refinement and conflict resolution remain challenging tasks in MANETs. With rapid
changes in MANET topology, it is very difficult for nodes to exchange and negotiate security policies with
their neighbors. Periodic consistency checking performed globally for the entire network may not be feasi-
ble under these circumstances. One possible approach is to define the MANET as small-scale clusters, to
facilitate local consistency maintenance.
5 Related Work
Previous work on firewall policy analysis mainly focus on studying the firewall configuration effects from the
view point of network administrators. [MWZ00] designed a implemented a firewall analysis tool to allow the
administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy. Their tool took the network topology and
configuration files as input and interacted with the user through a question-and-answer session. The main
advantage of this tool is to permit study of the firewall configuration before actually deploying it in the real
network. [BKLR06] proposed an approach to firewall policy specification and analysis that uses a formal
framework for argumentation based preference reasoning. By allowing administrators to define network
abstractions, security requirements can be specified in a declarative manner using high-level terms.
Another approach related to our work is on the composition of access control policies. Access control
policies have a very clear and restricted semantics over a collection of subjects, objects and action terms.
[WJ03] presented a propositional policy algebra for access control. They model policies as nondeterminis-
tic relations over a collection of subjects, objects and action terms. The goal of their policy algebra is to
manipulate access control policies at propositional level; the operations of the algebra are abstracted from
their specification details. Moreover, it can be used to reason about role-based access control policies com-
bined with other forms of discretionary policies. [BdVS02] took a different approach. They formulate access
control policies as a set of ground terms over an alphabet for subject object action terms. Thus, they took a
set-based approach influenced by logic programming.
Both of the above approaches have their limitation in that the proposed framework or analysis tool is only
for one specific policy language, i.e., firewall rules or access control policies. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to construct a policy algebra framework for security policy enforcement in hybrid firewalls.
We do not make any assumption on the policy language; thus our framework is applicable for any general
security policies. Moreover, we are the first to define cost and risk functions associated with each policy
enforcement. Based on the administrator’s goal, global minimization function can be applied to reduce the
cost of policy enforcement while still maintaining specified degree of security. We show how policy algebra
operations may introduce conflicts into the network. We use decorrelation algorithms to eliminate conflicts.
We also demonstrate how our policy algebra framework can be further extended to support packet filtering
firewall policies.
6 Conclusions
Firewalls are a effective means of protecting a local system or network of systems from network-based secu-
rity threats. In this paper, we propose a policy algebra framework for security policy enforcement in hybrid
firewalls. The framework describes external and internal algebra operations over rule sets and individual
rules, respectively. Cost and risk functions are associated with security policy enforcement. As a concrete
example, we extend the policy algebra framework to support packet filter firewalls. At the end of this paper,
we also discuss the challenges and requirement for applying policy algebra framework in mobile ad hoc net-




Avishai Wool and Sotiris Ioannidis provided many helpful comments.
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